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cific object of an analysis for which one could determine a precise field
of enquiry. Instead, it establishes tension as a specific mode or angle of
approach with which any given contingent object or set of objects can be
explored. The wideness of its applicability and the specificity of its angle
suggest that research on tension can help to unfold a better understanding
of a classical ontological question concerning the essential value of actions
and relations in the definition of what a thing is. The text follows this
line of argumentation by pairing contemporary philosophical sources and
specific aesthetic and political examples. Suggesting the possibility of an
open classification of different modes of tension, it clarifies the extent to
which the essential definition of a thing is bound to the contingent analysis
of its transformations.
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The following text starts from a predicament: if one takes ‘tension’ as 
an object of enquiry, the field of potentially fitting terms seems to be 
indefinitely expansible. It seems, in other words, possible to analyse 
everything in terms of tension, and this leaves the enquirer with the vex-
ing sensation that the consistency of her object of analysis is somehow 
diluted. Yet on the other hand, every time one tries to impose a strict 
limitation or definition to the field of research on tension, the opposite 
sensation arises, namely the sensation that an artificial restriction has 
been imposed to the enquiry, therefore excluding some crucial elements 
from the analysis. 
 How then to escape such a double bind, such an alternative 
between what one can call the ‘homeopathic deviation’ and the ‘watch-
dog deviation’? The point from which one can start is the following: 
if tension is indeed an idea that tends to expand itself indefinitely, it is 
because it is not precisely an object of analysis. Put differently, there is 
no such thing as a specific set of properties according to which one can 
say if a given object ‘x’ is or is not a ‘tension’, as one would say that a 
certain object is or is not a fruit, a concept, an adjective or an animal. 
Starting from this predicament, I propose to consider tension not as 
an object, but as a specific mode of seizure for any object. It is a mode 
of analysis of objects. This shift of angle entails a shift of question: in 
fact, the question of the present enquiry cannot be ‘what is tension’ but 
rather ‘what does one perceive of a given object when one analyses it 
in terms of tension’. Via a set of quite heterogeneous examples, we will 
see, in the following pages, what happens, and which consequences are 
produced, when something is defined and analysed not as an object, but 
as a point or moment of tension. I will in particular insist on how such 
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an approach – which renounces defining an object in favour of defining 
a relation1 – produces a non-finite analysis, in which a new term is con-
stantly found: a term that can in turn be analysed as a tensive relation. 
More specifically, I have selected a set of examples (the heterogeneity 
of which intends to stress that the analysis is not bound to a specific 
category of objects) through which one can see how the analysis of a 
specific mode of tension produces the identification of a further one. I 
therefore try simply to unfold how the analysis of abstract modalities 
of tension is, quite literally, a productive one: each analytic moment 
produces the identification of further angles of analysis. It should be 
noted that the relations between the different modes and models of ten-
sion that are thus found are always contingent, i.e. the analysis does not 
aim at producing a transcendental schematism, a fixed architecture that 
would contain all the possible relations between these modes and mod-
els.
 To lead an analysis in terms of tension means, from a philosophical 
perspective, to analyse at once some objects and their transformation, 
thereby excluding that one produces a definition of ‘what a thing is’ 
without taking its own modes of transformation into account. In other 
terms, an object is analysed not as a substance that endures acciden-
tal transformations, but as the result of a set of essential relations and 
transformations. This attitude has of course a long tradition in philoso-
phy, a tradition that can be traced back to the theory of categories of 
the Greek Stoics (for whom the most precise categorical mode of analy-
sis of a given object is the analysis of its accidental transformations) and 
extends up to the Marxist idea of the centrality of praxis in the defini-
tion of material reality. As a syncretic example of both the Greek and 
the post-Hegelian tradition, one can read a passage from an early Alain 
Badiou text, in which he claims: 
1 Of course ‘tension’ and ‘relation’ are not synonyms and the question remains 
of knowing which type of relation we are talking about when we speak about 
tension, and between what and what this relation takes place. To this extent we 
will provide along with the text some possible criteria to define a relation as ‘ten-
sive’. But first and foremost we will try to show that, when thinking in terms of 
tension, there is not only a shift of focus from objects to relations, but relations 
appear to be the fundament on which objects are thought. The question of the 
‘between what and what’ of a relation is thus somehow turned upside down.
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The internal nature of things, their essence, is nothing other than the law 
of their transformation. This principle is set in what one can call the Hera-
clitean heritage of dialectics: everything changes […]. The essence of this 
principle (the principle of reality as process) consists in the affirmation that 
a given state of reality is by definition transitory, i.e. that the law of things 
is neither balance, nor structure, but the rupture of all balance, and, by 
consequence, the necessary development of the destruction of the current 
state of things. […] Properly speaking, the real does not come under the 
category of the object. The object is in fact that which is given to knowl-
edge as a state or as figure. But the content of each state and each figure is 
the uninterrupted process of its own metamorphosis.2 
The conceptual analysis of an object in terms of forces which, standing 
in a tensive relation with each other, produce its formation and trans-
formation seems to have a possible double advantage: on an ontological 
level, it allows considering the production of transformations, divisions, 
and creation of new objects not as an accidental set of facts that objects 
endure, but as an objective element of their definition; on a gnoseo-
logical level, it configures a productive mode of analysis in which a new 
objective mode of tension is always found in the analysis of the relation 
between different types of tensions. 
 In order to frame the examples of the following pages, it is possi-
ble to identify a series of minimal common characteristics that different 
analyses of objects, led from the perspective of tensive relations, seem to 
have in common.
 First, as one analyses an object in terms of tension, the object 
appears under a relational angle. Each term is therefore essentially 
analysed in its relation to other objects. There is thus no such thing 
as the possibility of analyzing the essence of something ‘as such’, or as 
opposed to the accidentality of its relations.
 Second, the analysis of an object in terms of tensions is not an 
essentialist account of what ‘a thing is’, but a diachronic account of 
2 Alain Badiou, Théorie de la contradiction (Paris: Maspero, 1975), p. 51; (par-
tial) translation by Alberto Toscano available on different sites, e.g., <http:// 
 versuslaboratory.janvaneyck.nl/seminars/view/2> [accessed 1 June 2010]. Badiou 
also adds, in this sense, that the object is the opposite of the process, in the same 
way that metaphysics is the opposite of dialectics: ‘metaphysics – which is pre-
cisely the theory of identity – is driven by a powerful conservative tendency. It is 
an enterprise which guards the given state of reality’. This would be, somehow, 
what we call here the ‘watchdog deviation’.
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how a thing ‘works’:3 it describes in fact at once the internal tensions 
upon which the given thing is constituted, and the relational tensions 
upon which it is located in a space and a time. To ask what an object 
‘is’ becomes the equivalent of asking how it transforms itself, under 
which conditions, from what to what, producing which divisions, which 
destructions, which novelties.
 Third, an object being constituted by means of a set of multiple 
(internal and relational) tensions, one also needs to take into account 
the relation between such tensions. More precisely, the analysis of the 
relation between different tensions animating an object (as opposed to 
the analysis of a relation between specific objects) leads to the identifica-
tion of the mode of producing a new term, a new tension. The analysis 
of tensions is never simply analytical, but is synthetically productive, in 
the sense that it leads to the unfolding, to the discovery of a new term, 
of a new type of tension. The account of a system of different types of 
tensions is therefore characterized by the fact of being an expanding 
field.
 Fourth, in such an expanding analysis, in which the relation 
between different modes of tension produces the visibility of further 
relations, it is nonetheless possible to proceed in a consistent way, find-
ing a system of inclusion of new terms – what one might call an ‘open 
encyclopaedia of the modes of tension’: in the analysis of different 
examples, it progressively appears how – because of their relation nature 
– recurrent modes of tension cannot be analysed alone, but always – at 
least – in couples. Furthermore, it is exactly in the combined analysis of 
different modes of tension that a further one becomes visible. In order 
to give consistency to the analysis of tension, an important criteria can 
thus be to select those relations between types of tension that allow 
with particular evidence the identification of a further type. Therefore 
the examples in this article have been selected exactly for their capacity 
to show how the analysis of the relation of two models of tension pro-
duces the visibility of further types of tension. The following pages are 
thus an attempt to show how it is possible to not fall into the ‘watchdog 
deviation’, how it is possible to expand the account of modes of tension 
indefinitely without encompassing them in a given, close structure, but 
3 In more abstract terms, one might say that this approach can also stress how, in 
order to know ‘what a thing is’, the question ‘how’ is at least as relevant as the 
question ‘what’.
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nevertheless without falling into the ‘homeopathic deviation’. This text 
shows therefore, via a series of examples, how tension is an open para-
digm, always fed by new elements, a paradigm of which the expansion 
not only is structured upon, but also produces recurrences and rules. 
 Our aim is thus double: from a methodological point of view, our 
aim is to identify tension both as an object of enquiry and as a method 
of enquiry; as a consequence, from an ontological point of view, our 
aim is to identify tension as the perspective by which it becomes pos-
sible to seize objects not via their categorical classification, but via the 
analysis of the specific relations in which they are formed, and via the 
novelties that such relations produce. Tension becomes therefore the 
perspective through which the essentiality of relations and transforma-
tion is brought to centre stage.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
As a starting point of this enquiry I have chosen a classical couplet of 
examples, the advantage of which is to provide a logical exemplifica-
tion of a triple twist of tension: firstly, that tension is never accountable 
as a simple object, but always as a relation between at least two poles; 
secondly, that one type of tension is never a simple unity, but always 
tends to split into two; and thirdly, that the dialectic between these parts 
produces a transformation, in which a further type of tension may be 
identified. The seminal example, from which the present enquiry in the 
modelling of abstract types of tensions starts, is a strange object that 
can be read as a bow and as a lyre simultaneously.
 In fact, as one considers the bow and the lyre as possible models 
of tension, it is their relation that appears to be the most interesting. 
The bow provides the image of a tension that produces an interruption: 
the bow is used to interrupt a life, to create a radical cut in a situa-
tion (while the enemy attacks, the strength of the bow can reverse the 
situation in one’s own favour). Whereas the lyre, through its tension, 
produces a duration: a melody, which is a scan of time, comes out of 
the specific mode in which the different strings are put into tension. In a 
beautiful short text on the origin of philosophy, Giorgio Colli, the editor 
of the complete works of Nietzsche, observed the existence of a certain 
reversibility between the two: 
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Those tools [the bow and the lyre] were produced starting from an ana-
logue curved line, and using the same matter, namely the horns of a goat, 
jointed one to the other with a different degree. Thus the works, the effects 
of the bow and the lyre, death and beauty […] express the same divine 
nature, symbolized by the same hieroglyph.4 
First of all, the difference of their effect is the result of a different degree 
of tension applied in the folding of the same object (they are made with 
the same material and with the same technique of folding and connect-
ing different parts with a string). The same object with a different ten-
sion splits into two different objects: a difference of degree, a different 
intensity of tension becomes a substantial difference. As Badiou notices, 
a tension is interesting first and foremost when it reaches such a point 
of splitting: 
The critique of the metaphysical principle of identity must be radical 
enough to assert the thesis [according to which] the being of a transitory 
state of reality is transition itself, i.e. an internal division of which this 
state is a stage, a development. It is not enough to say that things are in 
movement, it is necessary to acknowledge also that the very concept of a 
‘thing’ does not express a logic of unity, but a logic of scission. […] The 
real is not that which gathers, but that which divides. That which happens 
is that which disjoins.5 
The bow and the lyre are the same thing (they have the same material 
substratum to which a similar type of physical tension is applied), but 
it is possible to identify in it a critical point, a given degree of tension 
below and above which it appears as one or another of the two actual 
objects.6
 In his enquiry, Colli remarks that these two objects are associ-
ated in the figure of Apollo and that, more precisely, the lyre and the 
bow in Apollo’s hands are the same thing. Amongst a quite extensive 
iconography, there are only a few artworks in which one can find the 
4 Giorgio Colli, La nascita della filosofia (Milan: Adelphi, 1975), pp. 41-42; trans-
lation is mine.
5 Badiou, Théorie de la contradiction, p. 61.
6 Things appear here thus as punctual, specific results of a set of forces which are 
in a mutual tensive relation. As we shall see, this perspective allows for a more 
detailed account not only of what tension is, but also of what a thing is. Namely 
we will see how for philosophy the term ‘thing’ itself bears witness to an irreducible 
tension that leads philosophy to define it as ‘essentially equivoque’.
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presence of the two attributes of Apollo, the bow and the lyre, at the 
same time. In fact Apollo often appears depicted or sculpted with one 
or other of such attributes, as if they formed together a sort of Kipp-
bild, i.e. a double image in which only one aspect can be perceived in 
a given moment, although in each aspect the other, absent term persists 
or resonates (therefore producing a constant back and forth between 
the two perceptions). One of the works in which both attributes are 
visible is Perugino’s Apollo and Marsyas:7 the painting depicts Apollo 
listening to Marsyas – a panic figure who incarnates the Dionysian ele-
ment. As legend has it, Marsyas was claimed to be the most excellent 
flautist. A flute is an instrument that deforms the face of the player,8 an 
instrument via which beauty and a certain disharmony appear as one. 
It is therefore often associated with a panic world, a world in which the 
beauty of music is linked to disharmony, even with a certain violence: in 
fact the force necessary to blow and produce beauty is at the very same 
time a force producing something ugly (in this sense one can say that 
it is proper violence, i.e. a force producing disgrace). It might be inter-
esting to remark that this force – which produces at once beauty and 
violence, harmony and deformity – is for the Greeks the pneuma, the 
principle of life itself. Deformity is a clear manifestation, embedded in 
the creation of beauty, of the violence that goes with life, for instance in 
the necessary decay and death of any (beautiful) living form. The legend 
continues that Apollo – the god of harmony – defies Marsyas in a con-
test where the Muses are called to judge the best player. After the Muses 
decree their equality, Apollo decides to make a second challenge, which 
consists of playing and singing at the same time (once again one can see 
a certain duality involved). Of course Marsyas, the flute player, cannot 
bear this duplicity: he loses the contest, and Apollo skins him to death 
as a consequence for having lost the contest, after having been claimed 
to be the best musician.9
7 Pietro Vannuci, called il Perugino (1450-1523), Apollo e Marsia (Paris, Musée 
du Louvre).
8 The legend goes that Marsyas picked up the flute that Athena threw away after 
having been mocked by other gods because her face was deformed while playing. 
See Ovid, Fasti, trans. by James G. Frazer, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), book VI, lines 695-711.
9 There are various and divergent ancient sources for the legend. One which 
stresses clearly the two phases of the challenge is for instance Diodorus Siculus, 
Library of History, trans. by C. H. Oldfather, 12 vol (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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 What is striking in Perugino’s painting is the distant calm that 
Apollo displays, while in fact he is about to unleash an incredible, 
deadly violence. One might somehow say that the movement of the 
Kippbild has been caught here, ‘frozen’ in the in-between moment, in an 
instant of suspension in which the tension between the two models of 
tension becomes visible. What the painting suggests by this frozen ‘in-
betweenness’ of two moments is the presence of violence at the origin 
of the new harmony. With the victory of Apollo a new order is inau-
gurated, a musical Apollonian order in which music does not entangle 
grimaces or violent faces, but which substitutes the simultaneity of a 
duality of beauty and violence with the simultaneity of two beautiful 
melodies. However the instauration of such an order relies on the most 
violent gesture: the god who installs a new harmonic order is the same 
one who punishes those who defy him. What is interesting here is that 
Apollo is not so much the god of harmony, but the one who doubles 
harmony by a (violent) gesture of separation between harmony and un-
harmony: he is the god for whom the removal of violence from the har-
mony of music proceeds through a violent gesture of exclusion. And he 
is also the god who transforms his strength of violence into a strength of 
harmony. A violent tension which produces an exclusion is reversed into 
a harmonic tension, into the logic of a harmonic duration, produced by 
a multiplication of tension in space (the chords of the lyre are multiplied 
in comparison to the bow) and in time (if each percussion of the chord 
produces an interruption, the repetition of a series of different percus-
sions produces a scan, or a measurement of time). A tension is reversed 
into another. Apollo, considered by Nietzsche as the figure of the 
removal of the Dionysian duplicity of the life forces, is actually the char-
acter wherein this duplicity exists, but is not perceivable, because it is 
removed by an extreme moment of tension/intensification that reverses 
itself into a new harmonic tension. In Apollo, violence and melody no 
longer form a unity through tension but two mutually excluded poles, 
each of which is a tension. With a last glance, the relation between these 
two poles is still perceivable in this suspended moment in which, in an 
apparent calm, Apollo listens to Marsyas. One therefore normally only 
sees the lyre of Apollo, and perceives the bow only in the moment of 
catastrophe. Trapped in the rational order one does not see the duplic-
University Press, 1933-67), II (1935), book III, §§ 58-59 and III (1939), book V, 
§ 75.
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ity of the underlying forces. As Colli says, ‘what Nietzsche has not 
understood is the double nature of Apollo […] symbolized by the two 
attributes of the god: the bow, showing his hostile action, and the lyre, 
showing his benign action’.10 The element that produces the duration 
of a vital sound also produced the death of the previous panic world 
by a violent tension that cuts the previous coexistence of violence and 
beauty in two. Therefore, a change from a synchronic coalescence of 
the two types of tensions to a diachronic one is produced here. And as a 
consequence, from within the harmonic moments of the new diachronic 
tension between tensions, tension-as-violence is no longer perceived as a 
constitutive element: one can no longer perceive, for instance, how the 
duration of a sound is possible only as a result of a violent cut. Conse-
quently ‘it is only in the deformed, illusory perspective of our world that 
these two elements appear as contradictory fragments’.11 
 One can thus finally make a double remark: first, the two tools are 
the product of the qualitative division of one tension, of which the com-
mon origin is forgotten by means of a process of objectualization of the 
two poles. As Heraclitus’ fragments already remarked, ‘they (ignorant 
men) do not know how that which is different harmonizes with itself 
(diaferomenon heōutōi omologeei). Harmony (of what is) stretched in 
opposite tension, like the bow and the lyre’:12 the ‘like’ reminds us that 
10 Colli, La nascita della filosofia, p. 40.
11 Ibid., pp. 41-42. This is, I presume, one of the reasons why it was so difficult 
to find an image of the coalescence of these two objects in the iconography of 
Apollo.
12 Heraclitus, Diels-Kranz B 51 (numbered 45 by Burnet). The translation combines 
elements taken from the following translations: John Burnet, Early Greek Phi-
losophy (London and Edinburgh: A. and C. Black, 1912), and Giovanni Reale, 
I Presocratici, frammenti della raccolta Diels-Kranz (Milan: Bompiani 2006). A 
few remarks on the text are necessary. First of all, the term ‘different’ in the sen-
tence ‘that which is different harmonizes with itself (diaferomenon eotoi omolo-
geei)’, has to be understood as ‘that which is differing’, ‘that which produces a 
diverging movement’. This idea is then further specified via its complement, i.e. 
via the idea that there is a ‘palintropos harmonie’ (‘harmonie’ is here a nomina-
tive case, and ‘palintropos’ is its adjective), a ‘connection’ or ‘tuning’ ‘which 
moves against or backwards’, or also a ‘connection’ or ‘tuning’ of ‘that which 
moves against or backwards’. If we put the two sentences together we see the fol-
lowing: when something differs so radically that it ends by moving backwards, it 
creates a harmonic closure (a tuning) with the element or point from which it dif-
fers. The seminal case is that of taking one extremity of a stick of wood forming 
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this is only an example for a more general pattern; it reminds us that 
such a false opposition between models of tension is simply exempli-
fied by the dialectic of the bow and of the lyre, but it is not exclusive 
to these two objects. And second, it is fundamental to notice that even 
each one of these instruments is in itself already double: the bow in 
itself, remarks Heraclitus, is already both life and death. The bow in fact 
in Greek is Bios, which (with the difference of an accent) means also 
‘life’, and therefore ‘the bow’s name is life, but its work is death’.13 The 
model of the bow and of the lyre not only seems to display a duplicity, a 
unity which divides into two different actions that are incompossible yet 
intertwined. It also has the characteristic to display how such a duplic-
ity can then be found also in the individual terms.
 The question therefore becomes: in this archetypical model, or bet-
ter: in this seminal example of tension, what is the new term that we 
discover via the analysis of the dialectic relation of the two types of ten-
sion it involves?
a line and folding it backwards: in this case we have a linear development upon 
which a tension is applied so as to perform an opposition to the direction of 
development; and we find that such an opposition produces a conjunction in the 
point in which one extreme touches the other. The reversed movement of opposi-
tion turns into a conjunction, and this produces a new harmonic structure. See to 
this extent the remarks of M. Marcovich in his introduction to the Editio Maior 
Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Merida: The Los Andes Uni-
versity Press, 1967), pp. 124-28. All this raises a third question, namely whether 
– as a literal interpretation of the content of the fragment seems to suggest – the 
bow and the lyre are just two examples of this model of tension, or whether – as 
the fact of choosing as examples exactly these two objects which are made of the 
same matter seems to suggest – such ‘harmony of the reverse movement’ is also 
a model that describes the relation between the two objects. It is clear that Colli 
proposes here this second interpretation. (I wish to thank Christoph Holzhey for 
his commentaries and for his reading suggestions on the topic).
13 Heraclitus, Diels-Kranz, B48 (numbered 66 by Burnet). Burnet translates ‘the 
bow is called life’, but we prefer to use ‘bow’s name’ as a more literal transla-
tion of the Greek onoma: in fact the expression ‘is called’ might make the reader 
think that what is here at stake is a subjective act of naming, while, for what 
concerns Presocratic philosophy, it would be highly problematic to affirm that 
names are subjective conventional decisions and not, for instance, essential ele-
ments of things or objective effects of their influence on subjects.
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What results from the analysis of the relation between these two terms 
(the bow and the lyre) is a more accurate perception of some aspects of 
the temporal dimension of tension. More specifically, interruption and 
duration appear as two important elements of tension that have to be 
taken into account back to back. In fact we have seen that the possibil-
ity of installing a duration of harmony is based on the separation of all 
violent aspects from harmony, and on the consequent concentration of 
violence in the radical gesture of a cut, of an interruption that eliminates 
within harmony any kind of ambiguous relationship with violence. A 
harmonic duration is made possible by the separation of the function 
of violence, which is condensed in a moment of violent interruption, a 
moment of violent cut. 
 Indeed, from the point of view of time, tension can be perceived 
in two ways: as a duration, as a phenomenon that lasts in time, or as 
an interruption that creates the possibility of a radical change. As an 
example of the first case one can take into account the idea that a liv-
ing organism is a homeostatic set of tensions that lasts as long as it can 
counterbalance the entropic set of forces that tend towards the dissolu-
tion of this tension into a neutral state. As an example of the second 
case one can consider the commonsensical idea of tension as a dramatic 
intensification of facts, which leads to a catastrophic turn, to a radical 
change. What is then the relation between these two dimensions? With 
the help of a visual example and of a textual example, these two aspects 
can be related in two ways. On the one hand, a tension can be created 
by the intervention of a radical discontinuity that interrupts an anony-
mous, flat duration of the present. A radical cut, in other words, can 
not only be the release of a tension, but also the genetic point of a new 
one. But on the other hand, one might say that this cut does not exist 
if it does not have a set of consequences that unfold it (and that, more 
precisely, unfold it in a duration). According to this last sense, a work of 
art that interrupts an academic situation (and the evidences upon which 
the academy relies) by a revolutionary gesture is nothing if it does not 
produce some consequences, if there isn’t a certain extension, a span, of 
the consequences that it produces. 
 In the late 1940s, Lucio Fontana produced (literally) a cut into the 
surface of the canvas, interrupting in a new manner, by this gesture, the 
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figurative domain of painting.14 The interruption was provided not by 
a simple anti-figurative gesture that expanded painting beyond the limit 
of representation, or beyond the limits of adequation between subjects 
and genres; more radically, what was removed was the double adequa-
tion itself of the pictorial gesture to the flat surface of the canvas and 
of the sculptural gesture to three-dimensional matter. But such a ges-
ture, without a series of artworks (from the same artist or from others) 
that unfold its consequences and make it become more visible, would 
have remained an immaterial gesture, disappearing in the moment of its 
appearance, and therefore non existing. It is such an ex-tension – pro-
vided by the works that follow it – that creates a consistency of the 
tension, of that tension which originated in the interruption performed 
by the initial vanishing gesture. In more general terms, one can say that 
only the duration of a cut realizes, makes exist, the cut of the duration, 
i.e. the cut performed into the academic distinction that assigns specific 
spatialities to specific arts. 
 A question then arises: what is the specific extension, the specific 
‘span’ of a cut, of an interruption? What is an extension of an inter-
ruption that does not transform this interruption into a new tensionless 
present? Beyond which extension, or under which conditions, do the 
necessary consequences that provide an artistic gesture with a substan-
tial presence in a situation create a new academia?15 Is it at the second 
artwork repeating this gesture? Is it at the third, or the fourth repetition, 
or at the fifth? At a certain point, after countless repetitions of the cuts, 
after a constant expansion of the same gesture of cutting, Fontana was 
considered in cheap talks as the stereotype of contemporary academia, 
or even as the stereotype of the artist who repeats his gesture each time 
that he needs to pay an installment for his new villa at the seaside.
 Therefore the relation between span and cut, interruption and 
duration (what is the duration of an interruption?) opens towards the 
necessity to name in a more precise way the regime of the temporal con-
sequences of a new tension introduced into a scene. More precisely, it 
seems that a double dialectic is possible between these two terms. What 
is the relation between the interruption of a duration, of a consistent 
14 One can see in particular the famous photo by Ugo Mulas, Lucio Fontana, 
Milano, (1964), where Fontana is caught in the act of cutting the canvas.
15 In politics, the question arising is for instance: where is the point in which the 
realization of a political revolution turns into a new form of State consistency?
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order of time, and the consistent order of time of this same interrup-
tion? This double dialectic is seized, as Deleuze noticed, by the concep-
tion of time by the first Stoa, for which time is conceivable only as being 
at once continuous and discontinuous: each present moment, in order to 
be identifiable, has to be something else than its immediate predecessor, 
and at the same time, in order to exist, it must express a certain dura-
tion. 
 Time is thus possible only as the interruption of a duration, which 
at the same time is also the duration of an interruption. It is for this rea-
son that Deleuze insists on the fact that time is double for the Stoics. On 
the one hand, time is Chronos, the continuity of the present, time as a 
well-ordered succession of presents in which each instant is the effect of 
the previous instant, which is its cause. On the other hand, time is Aion, 
‘the past and future [which] inhere or subsist in time’,16 time seized as 
the infinite totality of all the present, past and future moments, which is 
expressed in a different manner at each present moment: each moment 
condenses in a specific manner the totality of time, each present instant 
of a thing is a condensation of the whole universe, expressing the latter 
under a unique perspective. Thus in this second sense each moment is 
not the causally determined result of the previous one, but it is radi-
cally other than the previous and the following one. It is because of this 
second aspect that time endures the constant discontinuity that char-
acterizes it. But without the first aspect, this discontinuity itself would 
not properly exist, but would be a pure succession of vanishing points, 
lacking of any possible duration. Therefore each present moment is the 
tension between a duration of an order of the present, and a totality of 
time, ‘a future and past’ that ‘divide the present at every instant, and 
subdivide it ad infinitum’:17 the second is necessary in order to create the 
discontinuity of the first, which makes time change and pass, the first is 
necessary in order for this discontinuity to exist. The present is, in other 
words, the minimal point of tension between these two dimensions, and 
in each present moment, the two dimensions of time are true: ‘time has 
only the present with which to express the internal subversion of the 
present in time’.18 Thus the Stoics identify the existence of time with 
an extension (the present) in which the totality of time itself insists as a 
16 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (London: Athlone, 1990), p. 164.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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force of change: ‘time is an extension (diastema) […]. Only the present 
exists, past and future are, but they do not subsist actually’.19 But in this 
extension (diastema) all the past and the future insist, producing a radi-
cal discontinuity within the present as duration, as extension, itself. And 
in fact, the word diastema in Greek has a double meaning: extension or 
duration, but also interruption, which in contemporary language is for 
instance expressed by the word interval. In other terms, diastema is the 
name of time, caught in its only existing, present form, which is a twice-
tensive form: a first tension which is the one of a discontinuity affecting 
a duration, thereby allowing time to exist as a constant change, and a 
second one, which is the necessary present extension of such an inter-
ruption. Each present moment can provide such a cut that inscribes a 
difference in the continuous flow of the present only if it is provided 
with a duration. This is because each present moment manifests itself 
as an inner contradiction, between a discontinuity of the present and a 
lasting presence of such a discontinuity: without this double logic, the 
present itself, each present, would disappear, it would either vanish in a 
pure ephemeral interruption, in a void with no extension, or crystallize 
itself in a duration without difference.
 Here, a more abstract and precise terrain for a previous question 
arises: how can a present moment, a new change, escape its ephemeral, 
inexistent dimension, without at the same time disappearing in a new 
form of crystallization of time? How can a present moment extend itself 
in time without disappearing in a pure indifferent continuity? It is via 
the analysis of suspense that one can have a more precise account of this 
perspective. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
The temporal extension of an interruption, the proper duration of a cut 
performed into a duration, seems to take (at least) two possible forms:20 
it can take the form of a cut provided with a certain extension or dura-
19 Chrisyppus, SVF II 509 1, translated using Greek text and Roberto Radice’s Ital-
ian edition of the von Arnim Collection Stoici Antichi, tutti i frammenti (Milan: 
Bompiani, 2002).
20 I owe a lot, for this point, to a series of discussions with the Australian film-
maker Siouxzi L. Mernagh, alumna of the Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry.
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tion, which suspends the structure of a situation, or it can take the form 
of a cut which is the turning point of a dramatic intensification of the 
structures of the situation, and that therefore finally results in a quali-
tative change. In the first case, the duration of an interruption follows 
the initial moment of interruption and, more accurately, it allows us 
to recognize it retrospectively. In fact, an interruption in itself is noth-
ing. Having no extension or substance, it appears as a pure immaterial 
gesture, as an accidental, almost imperceptible, disturbance. It is only 
in its consequences that it becomes real, that it acquires that duration 
by which it comes into existence: the production of a substantive exten-
sion of its consequences forms something like the corpus, the body in 
which it is substantively realized. And this body of consequences is not 
only what one can indicate, but also the starting point from which one 
can retrospectively perceive, indicate and name its existence. What is 
obtained via such an extension of the interruption is properly a state 
of suspension of the situation in which this interruption appears. In the 
second case, by contrast, an interruption is operated as a dramatic turn 
produced as a logical result of an intensification. When a change in a 
situation and in its temporality is not produced by an interruption of 
the logical order of the present, but by the progressive and constant 
intensification of this same logic, this same intensification can result in 
an interruption. In this case, the interruption is not a minimal fracture 
that is retrospectively realized by a continuous series of consequences, 
(as in the case of the suspension), but is the qualitative leap produced by 
the quantitative accumulation of a given continuity, of a given duration. 
This second model is the one of the climax, which is therefore the struc-
tural opposite to the suspension.
 In narrative terms, moments of narrative suspension (as in the case 
of wandering, oniric sequences, but also, as will be seen, suspense as it 
appears in thrillers or horror movies) and climax seem to be two oppo-
site modes of extension of a tension: suspension works by extension of 
a present moment subtracted from the normal order of time (it is the 
duration of a cut); climax, on the contrary, is an intensification which 
preludes to a cut, to a dramatic turn. The dramatic turn certainly has 
strong durable effects, but these effects are nonetheless the dialectical 
result of the intensification of a normal temporality of the situation. In 
Hegelian terms, climax seems to be a moment of production of a quali-
tative leap from a quantitative accumulation, while moments of sus-
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pense or narrative suspension seem to be a radical change that cannot 
be dialectically subsumed in the story, because they are suspended from it. 
 Although formally opposed, these two modalities of tensive rela-
tions between interruption and duration have a mutual relation, as a 
recent distant debate between Jean-Luc Godard and Jacques Rancière 
on the power proper to cinema helps to establish. This debate revolves 
around the nature of the relation between the normal unfolding of a 
story of a film, and a moment of suspense inserted in it. More precisely, 
the debate revolves around the nature of suspense, namely if it is a 
pure state of suspension separated from the ordinary timeline of a film 
(a story provided with its own dramatic climax), or if it is a tool that 
allows the intensification of the story, thus producing the possibility of 
a dramatic turn.21
 By way of a specific magnification of this problem up to a cosmo-
logical perspective, Jean-Luc Godard presents, in the fourth video-vol-
ume of Histoire(s) du Cinéma, the first option, claiming that the space 
of suspense is properly subtracted from all narrative logic, because 
it offers a pure filmic, non-narrative, sensorial tension. The space of 
suspense thereby proceeds from a cut into the story and appears as an 
extension which suspends the continuous duration of the present (i.e. 
a suspension of the plot); it unfolds a non-chronological time in which 
one can have access to another, deeper dimension of the real, where the 
forces and the tensions underlying the crust of phenomena and banal 
stories can finally be revealed. Godard writes: 
We’ve forgotten why Joan Fontaine leans over the edge of the cliff and 
what exactly Joel McCrea went to do in Holland. We’ve forgotten what 
Montgomery Clift’s eternal silence keeps and why Janet Leigh stops at the 
Bates Motel and why Teresa Wright is still crazy about her Uncle Charlie. 
We’ve forgotten what it is that Henry Fonda is not exactly guilty of and 
21 Both authors start from the consideration that suspense, as we know it in horror 
or thriller movies, is not what at first glance would appear: a dramatic turn, a 
moment of unfolding of the logic of the film. On the contrary, the primary func-
tion would consist in revealing a different logic than the one of the explicit nar-
rative: the realm of dreams, of a hidden or forgotten nature, or of an unknown 
event that might happen and that we cannot fully anticipate following the logic 
of the facts, etc. In this sense suspense is a specific case of narrative suspension; it 
keeps the story on hold and it even undoes it, instead of doing it. Nonetheless, as 
we shall see through Rancière’s remarks, the narrative logic and the suspension 
of this logic are at once connected and disconnected.
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to what end the American government hired Ingrid Bergman. But we do 
remember a purse, a bus in the desert, a glass of milk, the sails of a wind-
mill, a hairbrush. We remember a row of bottles, a pair of glasses, a musi-
cal score, a bunch of keys, because with and through these Alfred Hitch-
cock succeeds where Alexander, Julius Cesar, Hitler and Napoleon had all 
failed: he takes control of the universe.22 
Cinema is here presented as the art of a generalized suspension, and 
suspension as the technique that allows us to perceive the true nature 
of things, the non-objectual, tensive nature of things: in order to per-
ceive the power of each thing, the images have to be subtracted from 
the narrative logic of the duration of the present, via a procedure of 
suspension. The creation of a realm of pure suspended images is there-
fore presented as the door to discovering tension as the true nature of 
things: tension is revealed as pure suspension, where it appears as the 
key to the universe (as in the moment of suspense in bad horror mov-
ies when entering the haunted house one discovers a deeper world sus-
pended from the ordinary logics of the present and of the story). More 
specifically, as the voice-over at the end of the excerpt suggests, it is by 
the process of montage that images can be subtracted, suspended from 
the stories, thus composing with them a style, a gesture, which reveals 
the tensive mechanisms of the universe: this is why, as he states at the 
end, ‘art is nothing else than the way in which forms transform them-
selves into style’.23
 Confirming and reversing the very logic of this claim, Jacques Ran-
cière stresses how this suspension – which in itself works exactly as 
Godard describes – is nothing else than the most powerful trigger on 
which the story – the order of the narration of the present – can rely, in 
order to continue its own narration, to continue with its own present, 
and to re-absorb tension. The idea of suspension as the door opened 
on the secrets of tension can thus be reversed: suspension can be inter-
preted as a tool of intensification of the present – as a tool that produces 
an intensification of the story, leading thus towards the production of a 
dramatic turn, of a cut which is in fact a dramatic resolution of the 
story – and not a radical change of it. Godard’s argument, Rancière 
says, ‘as such, is easily refuted’:
22 Jean-Luc Godard, Histoire(s) du cinema (Paris: Gaumont, 1997), IV, Episode 1 
[on DVD].
23 Ibid.
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Godard, clearly, makes his point by dissociating things that are indissoci-
able. We don’t remember the bottles of Pommard in Notorious because 
of their pictorial qualities but because of the emotional charge that the 
narrative situation has invested in them. The bottle that wobbles and falls 
interests us because it contains the uranium Alicia and Devlin are look-
ing for; because we know that while they’re searching the wine cellar, the 
champagne at the reception upstairs is running out and Alicia’s husband 
Sebastian, a Nazi agent, will presently step down to the cellar with his 
butler to fetch some more, hear the bottle falling, and notice that his key 
to the cellar is missing because Alicia has taken it. The same goes for all 
the images Godard evokes: in every case, it is the narrative situation that 
lends importance to the objects. It is easy, then, to refute Godard’s argu-
ment. The problem, though, is that Godard doesn’t oppose arguments, he 
opposes images. What we see running parallel with this discourse are other 
images made from Hitchcock’s images. The glass of milk, the keys, the 
glasses, and the bottles.24 
Godard does not oppose argument to argument, thing to thing, present 
to present, but he opposes tensive relations between images to argu-
ments that put objects into a logic structure. He opposes one thing (as 
tension) to itself (as thing) by suspending the narrative logic in which it 
appears as a thing and thereby reveals the thing as a knot of tensions: 
from inside such space of suspension in which things become visible 
as tensions, one can follow the lines of the forces involved in these ten-
sions, and therefore gain a perspective insight into the mechanics of the 
thing (and ultimately inside the mechanics of the universe). In other 
terms, Godard explicitly ‘forgets’ to engage with the dialectical func-
tion of these moments of suspense/suspension, and conversely focuses 
on their intrinsic potentiality. Rancière’s argument is therefore correct 
(indeed the moments of suspension highlighted by Godard receive their 
aesthetic value by the dramatic structure of the plot that is reflected in 
them), but at the same time it appears here that Godard operates a radi-
cal choice: from the perspective of suspension for which he decides, the 
very point of view of Rancière loses its effectiveness. 
 Here a predicament is touched upon, and is structured on three 
levels. On the first level, from a temporal point of view, tension can 
be structured as an interruption of a duration, or as a duration of an 
interruption. On the second level – via the dialectics of suspense and 
climax – a duration of an interruption is at the same time the moment 
24 Jacques Rancière, Film Fables (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2006), p. 180.
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of possible Aufhebung, sublation of the original duration which is inter-
rupted: the suspense as an extension of an interruption in the story is 
the moment in which the story feeds its own structure, allowing the 
subsequent production of a dramatic turn. This is why the tension of 
the suspense can be understood only starting from the dramatic content 
of the film. Thirdly and finally, the space of suspense is at the same time 
an essential element of the general structure of the film and a moment 
in which something else appears under it. It is therefore undecidable 
which of these two senses one has to choose. In other words, there is 
a tension between suspense as the perspective point that allows us to 
discover tensions under the surface of well structured narratives and 
phenomena (and that therefore allow us to suspend or even disrupt this 
narrative logic), and suspense as a structural element of the logics of the 
narration, as a moment of dialectical tension that is finally reabsorbed 
in the normal development of a situation. Given this undecidability, one 
cannot calculate which of the two options is the correct one, but has 
to decide: decisions can in fact take place only on what is undecidable 
(otherwise one calculates options, but does not decide). Thus it is only 
an act of choice that can decide (in the literal sense of de-caedere, to 
perform a separation, a cut) and determine if the duration of the inter-
ruption is what produces the existence of the interruption or if it pro-
duces the reabsorption of the interruption inside the logic of the situa-
tion. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
This analysis of the duration of tension raises the question as to whether 
or not the extension of a tension is relevant to understand its relation 
to the situation in which it appears. It is clear that a decision needs to 
be taken concerning the relation between the point of tension and the 
situation in which it appears. The decision concerns this undecidable 
question: to what extent does this point suspend the situation in which 
it appears? And to what extent is it, on the contrary, an element of it? 
If such temporal perspective on tension points towards a tensive unde-
cidability, it might then be relevant to see if some decisive elements are 
provided by the spatial analysis of such points of tension.
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 From the preceding analysis of suspense, it has emerged that a 
point of particular tension – a point wherein the tension underlying 
each object is revealed – is a point which is at the same time part of 
the situation (this is why it can be reabsorbed as a turning point of the 
dramaturgy of this situation) and not part of it (it is different from the 
rest of the situation, of which it suspends the logic, by an intensifica-
tion of the manifestation of its contradictions). Such points, that at once 
belong and do not belong to the situation, seem to appear in three pos-
sible spatial determinations. First, a point of tension can be located at 
the very centre of the situation. This is, for instance, the case of the clas-
sical absolute monarchic sovereign, who on the one hand is the central 
point from which the law of the situation symbolically proceeds, and 
on the other is subtracted from this very law. Second, tension can also 
be located at the edges of the situation, where the laws of the situation 
are weaker, as in the case of a revolt that upraises on the distant borders 
of a vast empire, putting into question what belongs and what does not 
belong to the common space. And finally, a situation can have an unde-
terminable point as a point of maximal tension, a point the existence of 
which is known, but that one is not able to locate: this is, for instance, 
the case of a known threat that, exploiting the blind spots of a situation, 
produces evident effects but the precise nature and location of which are 
unknown. In all these different typologies, tension thus appears to be 
located in points which on the one hand condensate, synthesize the sev-
eral tensions of the situation, and which on the other hand exceed them. 
Jean Terrier, ICI alumnus, researcher in social and political theory, has 
suggested a textual example for a point of intensification of tension that 
appears to integrate these three spatial aspects. Carl Schmitt, in Theory 
of the Partisan, defines the partisan as follows:
In partisan battle a complexly structured new space of action emerges, 
because the partisan does not fight on an open field of battle nor on the 
same plane of open frontal war. Rather, he forces his enemy into another 
space. To the space of the regular traditional theater of war he, thus, adds 
another, darker dimension, a dimension of depth, in which the displayed 
uniform becomes deadly. In this way he provides an unexpected (but no 
less effective for that) terrestrial analogy to the sub-marine, which likewise 
adds an unexpected dimension of depth to the surface of the sea, where 
old-fashioned naval warfare was once played out. From underground, he 
disturbs the conventional and regular game on the open stage. On the basis 
of his irregularity, he alters dimensions not only of tactical, but of strate-
gic operations of the regular army. Exploiting their privileged relation to 
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and at the ground, relatively small groups of partisans can tie down large 
masses of regular troops.25
Without entering into the complicacy and the implication of this text in 
relation to Schmitt’s work, it seems important to underline how this text 
condensates the three spatial figures of spatial tensions in one example. 
The partisan is actually at the same time unassignable to a place (highly 
mobile), and absolutely central (she is characterized not as a frontal 
enemy, nor as a guerrilla-style ambush fighter, but as a sort of chtho-
nian force that pops up from the ground, in the middle of the situa-
tion of conflict). At the same time she is external: she is not considered 
as the classical enemy, as the dialectical other, with whom one shares 
the battlefield although on opposite sides, but she is on the contrary 
considered as non-existent in – and even as the non-existent of – the 
war situation. For instance fascists did not consider the partisans as 
enemies, but as bandits (in the literal sense of banned out of the situa-
tion, although undeniably internal to it) and therefore war conventions 
were not applied to them. For that reason the coexistence of these three 
spatial factors made of the partisans a major point of tension – even 
bigger than the actual military results that they have obtained –, a fact 
which allowed them to become – in Italy for instance – the main sym-
bolic reference around which the post-war political situation has glo-
bally identified its structures. Indeed, such an element that appears in 
this triple spatial mode of tension is inconsistent with the current logic 
of appearance of objects in the situation, but at the same time the mul-
tiple mode of its manifestation renders it impossible to deny its pres-
ence. The inconsistency of the partisans’ presence is as undeniable as the 
strength of their presence: they fight the fascist order without entering 
in a warfare dialectic with it, and they derive their efficacy by display-
ing their incompatibility with the space, the time and the laws in which 
the fascists operate. Therefore only a radical restructuring of the laws of 
the situation – those laws according to which their appearance is incon-
sistent – can be the outcome of the victory of such intensive manifesta-
tion. Once again, the tension between such an inconsistency and such a 
strength cannot be solved but by a decision: either the space in which 
they don’t exist or a radically new one.
25 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State Univer-
sity Press, 2004), pp. 48-49.
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 The essentiality of such figures of tension – which are stretched in 
a further tension between the strength and the inconsistency of their 
appearance – can be seized using an example referring to a non-exten-
sive space, namely the discursive space of philosophy. More precisely, 
after having claimed in the beginning that this enquiry does not concern 
tension as an ‘object of analysis’ (as if it was some-‘thing’) but as a 
mode of constituting things, and having claimed that the shift of per-
spective from objects to tension can provide an essential explanation 
that accounts at once for forms and for their transformation, we will 
see here that this approach does not concern a specific category of phe-
nomena, but concerns every-thing, concerns, for philosophy, both each 
thing and the idea of the ‘thing’ in its generality. 
 First and foremost, the word ‘thing’ appears to be highly difficult to 
locate in the space of philosophy. In fact, the term ‘thing’ is too vague, 
too large to enter inside a proper philosophical language: the word 
‘thing’ usually does not appear to enter inside the vocabulary of phi-
losophy, in which one can rather find – depending on different authors 
and schools – a series of more precise ‘substitutes’, such as object, 
body, shape, form, substance, essence, etc. Of course one can identify 
a few counter-examples, amongst which Heidegger is probably the best 
known. But even in such cases, when the term ‘thing’ is not kept out of 
the space of philosophy, the term seems to endure a difficult life inside 
of it. In the case of Heidegger, the word ‘thing’ is divided as soon as it 
hits the philosophical surface, specified as Sache and Ding, which makes 
it become more digestible by a classical philosophical appetite for analy-
sis. The same can be said of Descartes, for whom res is analysed only 
in terms of its division into res cogitans and res extensa. Too vague for 
the sharpness of philosophy, the question concerning the ‘thing’ seems 
thus to circulate on the edges of philosophy. But lurking in this border 
space, and not being really excluded from it, it provokes – as the cases 
of Heidegger and Descartes show – a constant transcription of itself, via 
the proliferation of other, more precise, philosophical terms. 
 But this localization is not sufficient, because at the same time the 
‘thing’ – the material, multiple, sensible, changing, indeterminate, exces-
sive and multiple ‘things’ that philosophy keeps at its edges – reappears 
also at its very centre, in the question ‘what is?’. ‘What is?’ is the ques-
tion where no specific object appears, where one acknowledges simply 
that some-thing is there, but no other property than the ‘thingness’ of 
the thing is known. This question is nothing else than the classical, cen-
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tral question of ontology, it is the question where the problem of the 
essence appears in its most non-determinative fashion. The philosophi-
cal question concerning essence is in fact possible only insofar as it is 
abstracted from the specificity of such or such other object, it is only 
possible insofar as it concerns every thing, the thing in its indetermi-
nacy.26 The confused, not sufficiently determined ‘thing’ which crawls 
around the edges of philosophy appears at the same time at the very 
centre of philosophy, introducing in it the necessary indeterminacy of 
the essence-as-such.
 The equivocity, the indeterminacy of the thing that gravitates 
towards the edges of philosophy seems to be bound to the absence of 
determination needed in order to respond to the question of being in 
its more abstract form. Aristotle noticed how being (the very fact that 
each thing ‘is’) is in fact necessarily equivocal and his argument unfolds 
as follows: in the opening of the Categories he indicates that normally 
all equivocity can be reduced to a uniqueness of sense, via two pos-
sible procedures. Firstly, is the case of homonymy, such as using ‘man’ 
both for a man in flesh and bones, and for a man in a painting: but 
such a type of equivocity can be reduced by finding two different words 
that can designate the two objects. Secondly, is the case of synonymy, 
such as when one says ‘animal’ both for a man and for a cow: in this 
case both are undeniably essentially animals. But the point is that, in 
this case, ‘animal’ only defines their common genre: although both are 
essentially animals, the essence of each of the two species is not com-
pletely defined by their ‘animality’. Thus in order to name the essential 
difference between a man and a cow one also has to specify the essen-
tial character of each species: in other words, ‘animal’ is synonymically 
predicated (as a second substance) in the first substance of both the man 
and of the cow, for which one has different names at one’s disposal.27 
 The point is that homonymy and synonymy form together almost 
the totality of possible equivocity: something is left out. Aristotle in 
Metaphysics Delta 7,28 notices that there is one, and only one, term the 
equivocity of which cannot be reduced either to a case of homonymy 
26 Italian is illuminating to this regard: ‘what is?’, this question with no specific 
object other than the indeterminacy of every-thing, is expressed as ‘cosa è?’, liter-
ally, ‘thing is?’.
27 See Aristotle, Categories, 1 a 1-20.
28 See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, Delta 6-8.
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or to a case of synonymy: this term is ‘being’. ‘Being’ means ‘to be’ by 
essence or by accident, by power or by act, by matter or by shape, but 
there is no meta-sense of these various senses: when I say that Socrates 
is a man, and that Socrates is standing, I cannot say that in one case the 
use of the verb ‘to be’ is appropriate and that in the other is not; but at 
the same time I cannot consider these two senses as two specifications 
of a sense which would embrace both. This entails that ‘to be’, the fact 
that ‘a thing’ ‘is’, is, as such, radically equivocal. 
 A tension provided by a radical indeterminacy circulates at the 
same time in ‘each thing’ (in the sense of all the ‘things’ that do not find 
a position as concepts inside philosophy), and in ‘everything’ (in the 
universal sense of ‘being’ that is said of everything which is). A tension 
found at the same time at the edges of philosophy and in its centre is 
therefore unfolded at the centre of each ‘thing’, as a split which divides 
each ‘thing’ from itself: ‘a thing’ is not simply a given present object, 
but it is something of which the sense cannot be reduced to a univo-
cal determination. And this is why the knowledge of what a ‘thing’ is 
requires the analysis of the tension between its different senses, a ten-
sion which takes place, as has been discussed, in the specific modes of 
its transformation.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
A ‘thing’ is therefore by essence undecidable: it is a tension expressing 
itself as form and as transformation, as a transformation upon a form, 
and as a form of a transformation, as a transformation attacking a form 
at its edges and at its centre, and as a transformation which is essential 
in order to define this very same form. This complexity or co-implica-
tion of layers in which one is called to decide where to resolve a tension 
in order to produce its further, stronger articulation, can be synthesized, 
as a final gesture, via an example taken from Paul Klee’s notes for his 
classes at the Bauhaus.
 Paul Klee notices, at the very opening of his sketchbooks, how each 
single point has, in the eyes of the observer, a chaotic aspect, because 
it is always an ‘undecidable complex’: whenever one considers a given 
point as a minimal element, this point, as little as one might pick it, 
is not, in fact, an elementary particle but an in-between of a series of 
opposites. It is neither uni- nor multi-dimensional, neither big nor small, 
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neither stable nor in movement.29 And if it displays such in-between-
ness, it is because first and foremost it has ‘an internal tension’. An 
internal tension that at the same time produces its shape and its move-
ment: it produces on the one hand the transformation of its shape, and 
on the other hand it produces the shape as an extensive existence of 
this same transformation. Therefore one cannot decide if a given object 
(that can be understood either as a sum of points or as the result of the 
movement of a point) is a shape that endures a transformation, or is a 
movement that acquires a shape, and that appears as a shape in a given 
moment: the only choice, which is typical of Klee’s work, is to display a 
form together with the genetic process of its formation, and to display 
also the partial forces acting on this form, together with a certain form 
or condensation of their activity.
 The complicacy of these ‘formal’ forces – in which it appears how a 
form is interrupted by a set of forces, and how a force can only act if it 
acquires a minimum of form – can be summarized as follows: on a first 
level, the present form of an object appears as the result of a ‘Spannung’ 
(tension), of an extension, it appears as the ‘in between’ of a series of 
forces ﬂ‡, as a zone of suspension or equilibrium (as Freud noticed in 
29 Paul Klee, Notebooks, 2 vols (New York: Wittenborn, 1961-73), I: The Thinking 
Eye (1961), pp. 3-7.
Fig. 1. Paul Klee, Notebooks, 2 vols (New York, Wittenborn, 1961-73),  
II: The Nature of Nature (1973), p. 301.
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Beyond the Pleasure Principle) from the influences of external aggres-
sive forces. Second, a given being appears at the same time as a con-
structive process ⟶, as a drive towards accomplishing a form via a 
transformation. The span, the extension of a given form, is inseparable 
from a drive, it is inseparable from its movement of transformation. 
The tension is thus always combined: span and Trieb (drive). This is 
why, for Paul Klee, the simplest account of the form of production of a 
phenomenon starting from the tension that inhabits its components, is 
the spiral, which is the combination of an extension and a directional 
arrow, of a Spannung and a Trieb (Fig. 2).30
 Third, each one of these models of tension composing the defini-
tion of the spiral (the span and the drive) is in itself double. In fact, for 
instance, a ‘span’ is the shape conceived as an extension, as the result 
of a movement of extension resisting external forces of aggression 
‡(ﬂ‡)ﬂ. But at the same time a tension as span is also the opposite 
of an expansion, it is the tension of an object resisting entropy, the ten-
30 Siouxzi L. Mernagh’s suggestions have been very important in order to drive my 
attention on the composite nature of movement of the spiral. Of course (I owe 
this remark to Christoph Holzhey) in order to obtain a spiral, one needs also 
a movement of rotation. Klee does not seem to insist specifically on this point, 
but one can notice how the combination of a series of forces (external forces, 
internal forces resisting to these, and internal forces of growth) produces a spiral, 
because it is very unlikely that the different forces work on the same axis and 
in opposite directions so as to produce a linear movement. The combination of 
forces (internal and external) on different axes would thus likely produce a spiral 
form, intended as a composition of a rotational and of an expansive movement. 
Fig. 2. Klee, Notebooks, II, pp. 18-19.
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sion of an object that tries to ‘make one’, delay-
ing its own dissolution ﬂ(‡ﬂ)‡. To this extent, 
for Klee, the actual shape of an object is possi-
ble only via a tension of extension coming from 
inside, stabilizing itself (temporarily) into a given 
form under the combined forces of the outside 
(as in the visual example of the generation of a 
leaf in Fig. 3).
 The formula of a being seized as tension 
would then be a spiral (a combination of an 
extension ﬂ‡, and a drive ⟶), integrated 
with a force from outside that tends to compress 
it ‡ﬂ. The complete schema of the form/tension 
thus develops as follows: 
1) a point, being at once force and form, is 
already in movement; 2) this movement is the 
combination of a Trieb and a span, and there-
fore produces a spiral, 3) each turn of the spi-
ral identifies a form: a point is thus nothing else 
than a form in movement which is artificially 
considered as the minimal element (in Fig. 4 one 
can see that a cube is nothing other than a larger 
point);31 4) this spiral is subjected to external 
forces to which it resists (this is one of the two 
senses of the span). The complete schema of the 
simplest possible real form is thus a three-dimensional leaf growing in a 
spiral, which one derives from combining the three images.
31 Therefore not only a ‘span’, but also a ‘drive’ is double: in one sense a ‘drive’ is 
identifiable with a set of tensions leading together towards the accomplishment 
of a form, of a more or less stabilized mode of appearance, but at the same time 
a transformation is always the transformation of a form. Tension does not thus 
come chronologically before the form, but it is important to seize it as being 
more than a simple accident affecting forms, as thus having a certain ontological 
primacy, or at least a clear ontological co-extension with form. 
Fig. 3. Klee, Notebooks, I: The Thinking Eye 
(1961), p. 33. 
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 All these elements, these layers of tensions – usually defined as 
being divided in essential and accidental, internal and external – all have 
the same ontological relevance in the definition of what a ‘thing’ is: a 
‘thing’ is the layered process of interruption of a state of fact by a sys-
tem of tensions that are not reducible to a common denominator, and 
in which each single tension can exist only insofar as it has an actual, 
concrete extension and duration. The result of this definition is triple. 
First, on an ontological level it helps us to unfold some aspects of the 
fact that the definition of the essence of an object, the definition of what 
an object is, is indissociable from its praxicality, from what ‘it does’ 
and from what ‘is done with and of it’. Second, this definition of the 
object as an undecidable tension between a form under tension and the 
form of a tension appears to be inseparable from the necessity to posit 
a moment of decision, a moment in which a subject is forced to choose, 
i.e. to select amongst all objects those in which the processes that defines 
them is most evident and most promising. Third, we have seen that such 
a necessity to decide upon moments of tensive undecidability always 
leads to the identification of new modes of tension. Because of this, it 
appears that the proper form for an account of tension is to maintain 
– or more precisely to produce – an open encyclopedia of the prolifera-
tion of its senses. And this is an endless task in which things appear as 
essentially poietic, productive and able to produce novelty.
Fig. 4. Klee, Notebooks, II, p. 301  
(indication of the spiraliform movement  
constituting the cube added by B.B.).
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